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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
 
 
In the Matter of Max Singleton, Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000402 
ORDER 
By order dated November 7, 2014, respondent was placed on interim suspension.  
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel now requests the Receiver be appointed to 
protect the interests of respondent's clients pursuant to Rule 31of the Rules for 
Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South 
Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR). 
IT IS ORDERED that Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, Receiver, is hereby 
appointed to assume responsibility for respondent's client files, trust account(s), 
escrow account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office accounts 
respondent may maintain.  Mr. Lumpkin shall take action as required by Rule 31, 
RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, to protect the interests of respondent's clients.  Mr. 
Lumpkin may make disbursements from respondent's trust account(s), escrow 
account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office accounts respondent 
may maintain that are necessary to effectuate this appointment. 
This Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution maintaining 
trust, escrow and/or operating account(s) of respondent, shall serve as an injunction 
to prevent respondent from making withdrawals from the account(s) and shall 
further serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that the Receiver, 
Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly appointed by this Court.
Finally, this Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, 
shall serve as notice that the Receiver, Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, has been 
duly appointed by this Court and has the authority to receive respondent's mail and 
the authority to direct that respondent's mail be delivered to Mr. Lumpkin's office. 
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 Mr. Lumpkin's appointment shall be for a period of no longer than nine months 
unless an extension of the period of appointment is requested. 
 
 
s/ Jean H. Toal  C.J. 
 FOR THE COURT 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
March 4, 2015 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Marvin Lee Robertson, Jr., Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000050 
Opinion No. 27505 

Submitted March 3, 2015 – Filed March 11, 2015 

DISBARRED 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Sabrina 
C. Todd, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
M. Baron Stanton, Esquire, of Stanton Law Offices, P.A., 
of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: On June 15, 2009, this Court disbarred respondent from the 
practice of law. In the Matter of Robertson, 383 S.C. 140, 678 S.E.2d 440 (2009). 
He has not sought to be readmitted.   
In the current attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent 
(Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
the imposition of discipline.  We accept the Agreement and disbar respondent with 
conditions as set forth hereafter.  The disbarment shall run concurrently with 
respondent's June 15, 2009, disbarment.  The facts, as set forth in the Agreement, 
are as follows. 
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Facts 
In 2007, Jane Doe borrowed money against a house that was not her residence.  
Respondent had represented Ms. Doe on various business matters in the past and 
referred her to another attorney in the same office building to close the loan.  The 
other attorney served as the settlement agent and handled virtually all aspects of 
the transaction before and after the closing.  On the settlement date, however, 
respondent conducted the closing on behalf of the settlement agent.  Ms. Doe then 
lent respondent $99,999.70 of the proceeds she received from the closing.   
Respondent submits he fully intended to repay Ms. Doe and did not expect to be 
suspended from the practice of law.  Respondent admits the loan constituted a 
business transaction with a client and he did not comply with the safeguards 
outlined in Rule 1.8(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR.  
Specifically, the transaction and its terms were not communicated to Ms. Doe in 
writing, she was not advised of the desirability of consulting independent legal 
counsel, and she never signed any document agreeing to the terms of the loan.  
Respondent made some payments on the loan but ceased making payments in early 
2008, around or after the time he was placed on interim suspension by consent.  In 
the Matter of Robertson, Order (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed February 22, 2008) (Shearouse 
Adv. Sh. No. 8 at 14).  The Court accepted respondent and ODC's Agreement for 
Discipline by Consent and disbarred respondent on June 15, 2009.  In the Matter of 
Robertson, supra. Ms. Doe filed her complaint in March of 2010.  Respondent 
owes Ms. Doe a principal balance of $93,999.70.   
Law 
Respondent admits that by his conduct he has violated the following provisions of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR:  Rule 1.8 (lawyer shall not 
enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire ownership, 
possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to client unless:  (1) 
transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires interest are fair and reasonable 
to client and fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in manner that can be 
reasonably understood by client; (2) client is advised in writing of desirability of 
seeking and given reasonable opportunity to seek advice of independent legal 
12
 
  
 
 
 
 
counsel on transaction; and (3) client gives informed consent, in writing signed by  
client, to essential terms of transaction and lawyer's role in the transaction, 
including whether the lawyer is representing client in transaction).   
Respondent also admits he has violated the following Rules for Lawyer 
Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR:  Rule 7(a)(1) (it shall be ground for 
discipline for lawyer to violate Rules of Professional Conduct). 
Conclusion 
We accept the Agreement and disbar respondent concurrently with his June 15, 
2009, disbarment.  Further, we order respondent to fully repay Ms. Doe.  To ensure 
repayment, respondent shall enter into a restitution plan with the Commission on 
Lawyer Conduct (the Commission) no later than thirty (30) days from the date of 
this opinion.  Respondent shall pay the costs incurred in the investigation and 
prosecution of this matter by ODC and the Commission within thirty (30) days of 
the date of this opinion.  Finally, respondent shall complete the Legal Ethics and 
Practice Program Ethics School prior to filing a Petition for Reinstatement.  Under 
no circumstances shall respondent be permitted to file a Petition for Reinstatement 
until full restitution and payment of costs have been made to Ms. Doe and as 
ordered in the 2009 opinion disbarring respondent from the practice of law.  
Accordingly, we accept the Agreement and disbar respondent for his misconduct. 
DISBARRED. 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., 
concur. 
13
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina
  
In the Matter of Joel Thomas Broome, Petitioner 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000400 
 
ORDER 
On February 11, 2015, Respondent was suspended from the practice of law 
for a period of six (6) months, retroactive to October 9, 2013.  He has now 
filed an affidavit requesting reinstatement pursuant to Rule 32, of the Rules 
for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement contained in Rule 413, SCACR. 
 
The request is granted and he is hereby reinstated to the practice of law in this 
state. 
 
 FOR THE COURT 
 
 
s/ Daniel E. Shearouse  
CLERK 
 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
March 4, 2015 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
In the Matter of John Wesley Locklair, III, Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000481 

Appellate Case No. 2015-000482 

Appellate Case No. 2015-000484 

ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel petitions this Court to place respondent on 
interim suspension and/or to transfer him to incapacity inactive status pursuant to 
Rule 17 and Rule 28 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) 
contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).  The 
petition also seeks the appointment of the Receiver, Peyre T. Lumpkin, pursuant to 
Rule 31, RLDE. 
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
and he is transferred to incapacity inactive status until further order of this Court. 
Respondent is hereby enjoined from taking any action regarding any trust, escrow, 
operating, and any other law office account(s) respondent may maintain at any 
bank or other financial institution, including, but not limited to, making any 
withdrawal or transfer, or writing any check or other instrument on the account(s).   
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Lumpkin is hereby appointed to assume
responsibility for respondent's client files, trust account(s), escrow account(s), 
operating account(s), and any other law office account(s) respondent may 
maintain. Mr. Lumpkin shall take action as required by Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, 
SCACR, to protect the interests of respondent's clients.  Mr. Lumpkin may make 
disbursements from respondent's trust account(s), escrow account(s), operating 
account(s), and any other law office account(s) respondent may maintain that are 
necessary to effectuate this appointment.  Respondent shall promptly respond to 
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 Mr. Lumpkin's requests for information and/or documentation and shall fully 
cooperate with Mr. Lumpkin in all other respects.     
   
Further, this Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution 
maintaining trust, escrow, operating, and/or any other law account(s) of 
respondent, shall serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that Peyre 
T. Lumpkin has been duly appointed by this Court and that respondent is enjoined 
from making withdrawals or transfers from or writing any check or other 
instrument on any of the account(s). 
 
This Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, shall 
serve as notice that the Receiver, Peyre T. Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly 
appointed by this Court and has the authority to receive respondent's mail and the 
authority to direct that respondent's mail be delivered to Mr. Lumpkin's office. 
 
Finally, the Court appoints Debra Chapman, Esquire, as Attorney to Assist the 
Receiver pursuant to Rule 31(h), RLDE.   
 
The appointments shall be for a period of no longer than nine months unless an 
extension of the appointments is requested. 
 
s/ Jean H. Toal  C.J. 
 FOR THE COURT 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
March 6, 2015 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
Marvin Bowens Green, Appellant. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2012-212739 
Appeal From Charleston County 

Kristi Lea Harrington, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5302 

Heard January 8, 2015 – Filed March 11, 2015 

AFFIRMED 
Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia, 
for Appellant. 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 
Attorney General Jennifer Ellis Roberts, both of 
Columbia; Amie L. Clifford, of the South Carolina 
Commission on Prosecution Coordination, of Columbia; 
and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, all for 
Respondent. 
LOCKEMY, J.: Marvin Bowens Green was convicted of possession of a weapon 
during the commission of a violent crime (possession of a weapon) and armed 
robbery. The trial court sentenced him concurrently to five years' imprisonment 
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for possession of a weapon and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 
(LWOP) for armed robbery. Green appeals, arguing the trial court erred in (1) not 
giving the jury specific instructions concerning how to analyze identification 
evidence; (2) allowing the State to introduce his "mug shot"; and (3) sentencing 
him to LWOP in violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment.  We affirm.   
FACTS
On December 24, 2010, a man entered Natubhai Patel's (Victim's) convenience 
store and robbed him at gunpoint.  At trial, Victim testified the man was "wearing 
sunglasses, a red hat, a black jacket, and khaki pants."  He recognized the man as a 
regular customer he had known for approximately one year, who came into his 
store three times a week to purchase cigarettes, gas, and lottery tickets.  Victim
explained he and the man had a running joke about President Barack Obama's 
signature being on the man's identification.  Victim identified Green in court as the 
man who robbed him. According to Victim, the police arrived at the store after the 
robbery and viewed surveillance video of the robbery with him.  Thereafter, the 
trial court admitted the surveillance video without objection.   
Detective Charles Lawrence investigated the robbery.  He reviewed the 
surveillance video and recognized the perpetrator as Green.  Detective Lawrence 
knew Green and was able to identify him as the robber because of Green's "walk, 
height, weight[,] and structure of his face."  He explained Green had a distinctive 
nose that led him to identify Green as the man in the video.  Detective Lawrence 
asserted he was 100% positive Green was the man in the surveillance video.  After 
he identified Green as the robber, Detective Lawrence generated a six-person 
photo line-up and arranged to meet with Victim to see if he could identify the man 
who robbed him.  According to Detective Lawrence, Victim identified Green as 
the robber in a photographic line-up. The trial court admitted the line-up photo of 
Green over his objection. 
The State then asked to hold a bench conference outside the presence of the jury.  
It moved to admit a "booking photo" of Green (the booking photo) that was taken 
following his arrest for the robbery.  The State argued the booking photo was 
relevant because 
[i]t shows [Green's] side profile, it's from when he was 
arrested from this instance so it's not a prior incident.  It 
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has nothing to do with [Rule] 404(b)[,SCRE,] but it's 
relevant so the jury can see him and be able to look at 
this and look at the [surveillance] video. 
Green objected, arguing it was reversible error to admit a "booking photo" and the 
following colloquy occurred: 
[The State]: I don't have a problem if you want me to cut 
those photos, cut the top half off. 
[Green]:  Yeah, but, I mean, it still shows it's a booking 
photo. 
The Court: Let's just mark it for identification.
Thereafter, the State moved to admit the booking photo, and Green objected under 
Rule 404(b). The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the photo as 
State's Exhibit 5, but it did not allow the State to publish the photo to the jury at 
that time. 
SLED investigator Joseph West testified he obtained still photographs from the 
surveillance video of the robbery. The trial court admitted the still photos over 
Green's objection.   
Jagruti Patel, Victim's wife, testified she recognized the man in the surveillance 
video as a regular customer who often came into the store to buy cigarettes, lottery 
tickets, and gas. She recalled him joking about President Obama signing his 
driver's license.  Patel identified Green in court as the man in the video.  
After the State rested, Green asked for clarification regarding the trial court's ruling 
on the booking photo. The trial court noted it admitted the photo earlier but did not 
allow the State to publish it to the jury. The court explained the State planned to 
submit a redacted, color copy of the photo that was enlarged so that it was "in 
conformity" with "all the other paper page sizes."  Green renewed his objection to 
the booking photo, and the following exchange occurred:
[Green]:  And we believe we have sort of a front picture, 
side pictures. Any . . . reasonable juror can infer that's a 
booking photo.
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The Court: But that's not standard, is it?  That's not what 
I'm concerned with. We can infer anything from
anything and the case that you provided indicates that it 
was a different type of photo.  It was the actual booking 
photo.  We all know that [Green] was arrested and there 
was indication that he was booked, and the case that you 
provided me . . . the date was around his neck on his 
booking photo, which was prior to the arrest that he was 
being tried for.1 
[Green]:  Yes, [y]our Honor.  Basically, when you look at 
the three factors in the case we don't believe the [State] 
need[s] to introduce the photograph. 
The Court: The reason that [the State] indicated to the 
[c]ourt that they needed [the booking photo] is because 
they needed a side profile picture.  When we approached 
at the bench there was a discussion, because I'm not sure 
if it was on the record, there was a discussion on what 
would be admissible. 
Mr. Groeber indicated that his major objection was to the 
top and to the bottom row because it clearly then 
indicated that it came from Charleston County.  There's 
absolutely no distinguishing marks on the remaining two 
photographs.  There's nothing to indicate that . . . [Green 
is] in a jail suit or anything around the neck as in the case 
that you provided, and so I made the decision to cut the 
top and the bottom off of those pictures.  So back to my 
initial question, Mr. Grimes. 
[Green]:  Yes, ma'am. 
The Court: They have a larger picture of what I have had 
redacted. Okay. So it's now - - that picture is a full page. 
There was an objection because during the redaction now 
it's a smaller page. 
1 The record does not reveal what case the trial court was referring to.   
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[Green]:  Yes, ma'am. 
The Court: So which would you prefer me, preserving 
all of your objections, give the bigger page so that it's in 
conformity with all the other paper page sizes or the 
smaller page that's black and white? 
[Green]:  Preserving everything we prefer the bigger 
photo to go back. 
The Court: All right. If we will, just so the record is
clear, we will mark that as 5-A.  Five does not go back. 
Did you understand, Mr. Grimes?  Did you hear what I 
said? 
[Green]:  They are substituting the - - 
The Court:  I'm not substituting because I want the record 
to be thoroughly preserved. This will be 5-A, and 5, the 
redaction that I did cutting, it will not go back but it will 
remain as 5.  The one 5-A will go back. 
The trial court then admitted the redacted booking photo as State's Exhibit 5-A 
over Green's objection.  
Thereafter, Green called Dr. Jennifer Beaudry, an assistant professor of psychology 
at the University of South Carolina Beaufort, to testify regarding eyewitness 
identification procedures and "people's perceptions of those procedures."  The trial 
court qualified her as an expert in "human memory and eyewitness identification" 
without objection. Dr. Beaudry first testified regarding common misconceptions 
about human memory, including that memory works "like a video camera," and 
that a person is more likely to recall the details of a traumatic event.  Dr. Beaudry 
testified factors that can affect a person's ability to encode information, include:  
the presence of a weapon, whether the perpetrator is wearing a disguise, and 
whether the perpetrator and witness are of the same race.  She further stated that 
lighting, exposure time, and stress also affect a person's ability to recall 
information.  Specifically, Dr. Beaudry explained stress and "weapon focus" 
reduce a witness's identification accuracy.  She also stated "research shows that 
[people are] much better at identifying someone of [their] own race than 
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identifying somebody of a different race" and that cross-racial identification 
increases the chances of a false identification.   
Following Dr. Beaudry's testimony, Green submitted proposed jury instructions 
regarding identification.2  "Request to Charge Number One" advised the jury to 
consider the extent to which the perpetrator's features were visible, whether there 
were any distractions during the eyewitness's observation, whether the eyewitness 
experienced stress or fright at the time of the observation, and whether the 
witness's identification may have been impaired by personal motivations, biases, 
and prejudices. It instructed the jury to consider issues implicated by cross-racial 
identifications; specifically, that "[i]dentification by a person of a different race 
may be less reliable than identification by a person of the same race."  This 
instruction also provided the jury with guidance concerning how to determine 
whether the identification was a product of the witness's own memory.   
"Request to Charge Number 2" included instruction regarding the witness's 
opportunity to observe the subject of his testimony, whether the witness had 
something to gain by his testimony, motivation to lie, consistency of testimony, 
believability in light of the other evidence, and whether "there [was] anything 
about the way the witness testified that made the testimony more or less 
believable." 
The trial court refused to issue Green's requested charges and stated it would 
charge the jury its "standard identification charge."  It then gave the jury the 
following instruction regarding how to evaluate identifications made by witnesses: 
2 The requested charges were based on cases from Utah and North Carolina.  See, 
e.g., State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986) (stating trial courts must give a 
"cautionary instruction" whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in the 
case and that instruction is requested by the defense); Kimiko Toma v. Utah Power
& Light Co., 365 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1961), overruled on other grounds by
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1985) (providing that "[juries] are not 
bound to believe all that any witness may have testified to nor are they bound to
believe any witness. They may believe one witness as against many or many as 
against one."); State v. Black, 239 S.E.2d 276, 278 (N.C. 1977) (reversing the trial 
court for failing to give a North Carolina standard charge that "'the jury should be 
directed to scrutinize the evidence of a paid detective and make proper allowances 
for the bias likely to exist in one having such an interest in the outcome of the 
prosecution'" (quoting State v. Boynton, 71 S.E. 341, 344 (N.C. 1911))). 
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An issue in this case is the identification of the defendant 
as the person who committed the crime charged.  The 
State has the burden of proving identity beyond a 
reasonable doubt. You must be satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of 
the defendant before you may convict the defendant. 
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or 
impression by a witness. You must determine the 
accuracy of the identification of the defendant.  You must 
consider the believability of each identification witness in 
the same way as any other witness. 
You may consider whether the witness had an adequate 
opportunity to observe the offender at the time of the 
offense. This will be affected by things like how long or 
short a time was available, how far or close the witness 
was, the lighting conditions, and whether the witness had 
a chance to see or know the person in the past. 
Once again, I instruct you, the burden of proof on the 
State extends to every element of the crime charged and 
this specifically includes the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as the 
person who committed the crime.   
If after examining the testimony you have a reasonable 
doubt as to the accuracy of the identification you must 
find the defendant not guilty.
Following the instructions, Green renewed his requests to charge, arguing the 
omission of his requested charges "deprived [him of] the right to a fair trial, the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by his peers."  Green explained the proposed 
charges would assist the jury's evaluation of the identifications made in the case; 
specifically, relate to the jury its ability to consider whether the witness was 
distracted and experienced "weapon focus," whether the witnesses had the requisite 
ability to identify a member of a different race, and allowed the jury to consider the 
length of time between exposure and identification and the exposure of the 
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 witnesses to opinions of other people during the interval.  The trial court declined 
to change its charge. 
The jury convicted Green of armed robbery and possession of a weapon.  Green 
had a prior conviction for armed robbery and, before trial, the State had informed 
him he was facing a mandatory LWOP sentence pursuant to the recidivist statute, 
section 17-25-45 of the South Carolina Code (2014).  Immediately before 
sentencing, Green argued a sentence of LWOP would violate the Eighth 
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment because he was a juvenile at 
the time of his prior conviction.  He explained that although he was twenty years 
old at the time of sentencing, and nineteen years old at the time of the current 
offense, he was only seventeen years old when he committed the prior offense that 
served as the triggering offense under the recidivist statute.  The trial court rejected 
Green's argument and sentenced him to LWOP for armed robbery.      
Following his trial, Green filed a motion to vacate his sentence, reasserting that his 
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment's ban of cruel and unusual punishment 
because he was under the age of eighteen at the time of the triggering offense.  The 
trial court denied Green's motion to vacate, finding that because Green was 
seventeen years old at the time of his prior conviction, he was not a "juvenile" 
under subsection 63-19-20(1) of the South Carolina Code (2010).  See id. (defining 
juvenile as a "person less than seventeen years of age").  In addition, the trial court 
found Green was not a juvenile at the time of his second armed robbery conviction; 
therefore, it "ha[d] no other alternative but to sentence [him] to mandatory 
[LWOP] pursuant to [section] 17-25-45."  This appeal followed. 
LAW/ANALYSIS  
I. Jury Charges 
Green argues the trial court erred in refusing to give his proposed jury charges 
related to identification. According to Green, the trial court's "standard" 
identification charge "failed to . . . inform the jury of how it should synthesize the 
additional facts and factors uncovered during cross-examination of the witnesses 
and through the testimony of [his] expert."  We disagree. 
"An appellate court will not reverse the trial [court]'s decision regarding a jury 
charge absent an abuse of discretion."  State v. Commander, 396 S.C. 254, 270, 
721 S.E.2d 413, 421-22 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  "To warrant 
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reversal, a trial [court]'s refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both 
erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant."  Id. at 270, 721 S.E.2d at 422 (internal
quotation marks omitted).  "A jury charge which is substantially correct and covers 
the law does not require reversal." State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 549, 713 S.E.2d 
591, 603 (2011). "[T]he trial court is required to charge only the current and 
correct law of South Carolina." Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).    
In State v. Motes, the defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing to give a 
"Telfaire"3 instruction, which was designed to "focus the attention of the jury on 
the identification issue and minimize the risk of conviction through false or 
mistaken identification."  264 S.C. 317, 326, 215 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1975).  Our 
supreme court found no prejudice in refusing the requested instruction because the 
trial court instructed the jury that it must find the testimony identified the 
defendant as the offender beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.  The court also noted 
identification in the case presented no "peculiar problem" because two witnesses, 
one of whom was the defendant's wife and another who "had ample opportunity" to
observe the defendant, both identified him as the perpetrator.  Id. at 326-27, 215 
S.E.2d at 194. 
In the present case, the trial court did not err in refusing to issue Green's proposed 
charges. The trial court's "standard identification charge" was an accurate 
statement of the law in South Carolina. See Brandt, 393 S.C. at 549, 713 S.E.2d at 
603 (explaining the "trial court is required to charge only the current and correct 
law of South Carolina"). Specifically, the trial court properly instructed the jury 
that it could "consider whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe 
the offender at the time of the offense," and that "[t]his will be affected by things 
like how long or short a time was available, how far or close the witness was, the 
lighting conditions, and whether the witness had a chance to see or know the 
person in the past."  Although Green requested the trial court further instruct the 
jury in such matters as the extent to which the perpetrator's features were visible, 
whether there were any distractions during the eyewitness's observation, whether 
the eyewitness experienced stress or fright at the time of the observation, and 
whether the witness's identification may have been impaired by personal
motivations, Green has failed to show error from the absence of his requested 
3 See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (fashioning a 
model instruction trial courts should give when identification is a crucial issue).   
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charges because the substance of many of his requested charges were included in 
the trial court's "standard identification charge."  Further, the trial court informed 
the jury that the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Green committed the crime; therefore, the trial court's charge "adequately focused 
the attention of the jury on the necessity for a finding that the testimony identified 
defendant as the offender beyond a reasonable doubt." Motes, 264 S.C. at 326, 215 
S.E.2d at 194. 
In addition, we believe some of Green's requested charges would have been 
improper instructions into matters of fact or comments on the weight of the 
evidence. See S.C. Const. art. V, § 21 ("Judges shall not charge juries in respect to 
matters of fact, but shall declare the law."); State v. Jackson, 297 S.C. 523, 526, 
377 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1989) (stating "a trial judge should refrain from all comment 
which tends to indicate to the jury his opinion on the credibility of the witnesses, 
the weight of the evidence, or the guilt of the accused").  Specifically, Green's
request to charge the jury that "[i]dentification by a person of a different race may 
be less reliable than identification by a person of the same race" would have been 
improper because it would have asked the jury to place less weight on Victim's 
testimony because he was of a different race than Green.   
Finally, we note that Green's reliance on two out-of-state cases—Brodes v. State, 
614 S.E.2d 766 (Ga. 2005) and State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)—is 
misplaced. 
In Brodes v. State, the trial court gave a "pattern jury instruction" on eyewitness 
identification that informed the jury "they may consider a witness's level of 
certainty in his or her identification in assessing the reliability of the 
identification." 614 S.E.2d at 767. The Supreme Court of Georgia noted that 
although Georgia has decided a jury instruction on eyewitness identification should 
be given when warranted by the evidence, "other states see such a charge as
superfluous when general instructions on witness credibility and burden of proof 
are given, or reject such an instruction as an impermissible judicial comment on 
the evidence." Id. at 771 n.6. The court concluded, "When identification is an 
essential issue at trial, appropriate guidelines focusing the jury's attention on how 
to analyze and consider the factual issues with regard to the reliability of a 
witness's identification of a defendant as the perpetrator are critical." Id. at 771. 
In State v. Long, the Supreme Court of Utah held that "cautionary instructions" 
based on those suggested in United States v. Telfaire, should be given when 
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eyewitness identification is a central issue in the case and the defendant requests 
the instruction.  721 P.2d at 492. The court, however, declined to adopt one 
specific instruction and decided to grant the trial court discretion in crafting the 
instructions. Id.
Our review of Brodes and Long does not convince us that the trial court's failure to 
give Green's requested charges was reversible error.  As noted in Brodes, South 
Carolina appears to fall in the class of jurisdictions that view instructions regarding 
"a witness's level of certainty in his or her identification in assessing the reliability 
of the identification" as "superfluous when general instructions on witness 
credibility and burden of proof are given" or "an impermissible judicial comment 
on the evidence." 614 S.E.2d at 771 n.6. Moreover, Long's approval of the 
Telfaire instruction is insignificant because our supreme court has declined to find 
error from the failure to give a Telfaire charge when, as here, the trial court 
properly instructed the jury concerning the credibility of witness testimony and the 
believability of a victim's identification.  See, e.g., State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 
735, 259 S.E.2d 120, 126 (1979) (finding "no merit" to the appellant's argument 
that the trial court erred in not issuing a Telfaire charge when the trial court's 
instruction on the credibility of the witnesses' testimony sufficiently covered the 
believability of the victim's identification); State v. Jones, 344 S.C. 48, 60, 543 
S.E.2d 541, 547 (2001) (holding a Telfaire charge was unnecessary when the case 
did not involve a single witness identification).  Therefore, the trial court did not 
err in refusing to give Green's requested identification charges.   
II. Mug Shot 
Green argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce his "mug shot" 
because it was unnecessary, cumulative to the State's case, and prejudicial because 
it suggested he had a prior criminal record.  We disagree. 
"Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."  Rule 402, SCRE. Relevant 
evidence is defined as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence."  Rule 401, SCRE. "Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence."  Rule 403, SCRE. 
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"A trial [court]'s decision regarding the comparative probative value and 
prejudicial effect of evidence should be reversed only in 'exceptional 
circumstances.'" State v. Lyles, 379 S.C. 328, 338, 665 S.E.2d 201, 207 (Ct. App. 
2008). "A trial [court]'s balancing decision under Rule 403 should not be reversed 
simply because an appellate court believes it would have decided the matter 
otherwise because of a differing view of the highly subjective factors of the 
probative value or the prejudice presented by the evidence."  Id. at 339, 665 S.E.2d 
at 207. "If judicial self-restraint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of 
a trial court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal."  Id.
"The introduction of a 'mug-shot' of a defendant is reversible error unless:  (1) the 
[S]tate has a demonstrable need to introduce the photograph, (2) the photograph 
shown to the jury does not suggest the defendant has a criminal record, and (3) the 
photograph is not introduced in such a way as to draw attention to its origin or 
implication."  State v. Traylor, 360 S.C. 74, 84, 600 S.E.2d 523, 528 (2004) (citing 
State v. Denson, 269 S.C. 407, 412, 237 S.E.2d 761, 763-64 (1977)).   
In State v. Traylor, the defendant argued the trial court committed reversible error 
in admitting "mug shots" of him into evidence.  360 S.C. at 83, 600 S.E.2d at 528. 
In the photos, the defendant was not shown holding a "placard" with an arrest date 
and there was no indication of a law enforcement agency; however, the photos 
"had numerical markings on the side, indicating a height in inches."  Id. at 77-78, 
600 S.E.2d at 524-25. According to the opinion, however, "the photo of [the 
defendant] was clearly a mug shot, revealed by the front and side poses, and the 
height indicators."  Id. at 80, 600 S.E.2d at 526. Our supreme court found the trial 
court erred in admitting the "mug shots" because the State did not have a 
demonstrable need to introduce them.  Id. at 84, 600 S.E.2d at 528. The court 
rejected the State's argument that it could not prove the defendant was in the 
victim's home without the mug shots because the defendant's accomplice testified 
the defendant was at the scene of the crime, and the victims testified at trial, 
describing the attack and the identity of the assailants.  Id.  Our supreme court 
noted the State could "very easily have questioned the victims as to their 
observations of the white male assailant at the time of the crime, his tall thin frame 
and thin face, in order to support their in-court identifications without resort to the 
photo line-up."  Id. Nevertheless, the court found the defendant suffered no 
prejudice by the admission of the mug shots because during cross-examination, a 
police officer testified the defendant's photo was taken after his arrest for his 
current charges. Id. at 84-85, 600 S.E.2d at 528. 
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In State v. Denson, the defendant challenged the trial court's admission of three 
photographs of him, arguing the photos suggested to the jury that he had a prior 
criminal record.  269 S.C. at 410, 237 S.E.2d at 763.  Our supreme court found the 
State had a demonstrable need to introduce the photos because the defendant's 
absence from trial made an in-court identification impossible.  Id. at 412, 237 
S.E.2d at 764. Additionally, the court found the photos did not imply that the 
defendant had a prior criminal record because they "were not the juxtaposed full 
face and profile photographic display normally associated with 'mug shots,'" and 
although one of the photos included the words "Richland County," the jury likely 
assumed the picture was taken when the defendant was arrested for his current 
charge. Id. at 412-13, 237 S.E.2d at 764. The court further noted the record did 
not show "the admission of the photographs in any way focused the jury's attention 
on the source of the pictures." Id. at 413, 237 S.E.2d at 764. Although the jury 
was informed that the photos came from police files, the supreme court found this 
testimony "only explained the source of the photographs, it did not draw particular 
attention to the source or implications of the photographs."  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
In State v. Robinson, the defendant argued the trial court erred in admitting a photo 
of him, "consist[ing] of three different poses:  (1) a full frontal pose, (2) a profile, 
and (3) a frontal view of the head and shoulders" with all written material on the 
photograph "blackened out."  274 S.C. 198, 200, 262 S.E.2d 729, 730 (1980).  
There, the victim was the sole eyewitness to a murder, and after the shooting, she 
identified the defendant's photo as that of the assailant; however, at a subsequent 
police line-up, she identified another individual as the assailant. Id. at 199, 262 
S.E.2d at 730. After the defense cross-examined the victim about her failure to 
identify the defendant at the police line-up, the State introduced the photo of the 
defendant. Id. at 199-200, 262 S.E.2d at 730. On appeal, our supreme court found 
the State had a demonstrable need to introduce the photo because the defendant 
emphasized the victim's failure to identify the defendant at the police line-up and 
her description of the assailant after the shooting; therefore, the photo was needed 
to show the jury that the photographic identification was valid and reliable.  Id. at 
200-01, 262 S.E.2d at 730. Additionally, the court found nothing on the face of the 
photo indicated that the defendant had a prior criminal record, and the jury could 
have easily inferred that the photo was taken when the defendant was arrested for 
the current charge. Id. at 201, 262 S.E.2d at 730. 
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 Here, the trial court did not err in admitting the booking photo because the 
probative value of the booking photo was not substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, and the State satisfied the three-factor test for the 
admissibility of a mug shot under State v. Denson. See Rule 403; Traylor, 360 
S.C. at 84, 600 S.E.2d at 528 (stating "[t]he introduction of a 'mug-shot' of a 
defendant is reversible error unless: (1) the [S]tate has a demonstrable need to 
introduce the photograph, (2) the photograph shown to the jury does not suggest 
the defendant has a criminal record, and (3) the photograph is not introduced in 
such a way as to draw attention to its origin or implication."  (citing Denson, 269 
S.C. 407, 237 S.E.2d 761)). 
First, the State had a demonstrable need to introduce the booking photo.  The photo 
included a side-view of Green's face, which the State needed to show the jury 
because it allowed the jury to compare the photo to the still photos from the 
surveillance video of the robbery, which also showed the side of the assailant's 
face. Although Green appeared at trial and the jury presumably could see his face, 
admitting the booking photo into evidence allowed the jury to compare the 
booking photo to the photos of the robbery during its deliberations.  In addition, 
the side-view photo of Green's face was highly probative because it depicted a 
clear shot of Green's nose, which Detective Lawrence described as very distinctive 
and one of the reasons he was able to identify Green as the assailant from the 
surveillance video. Thus, the booking photo was also important for witness 
credibility because it allowed the jury to assess Detective Lawrence's identification 
of Green as the man in the surveillance video.  The probative value of the booking 
photo was further enhanced because Green challenged the reliability of Victim's 
identification; therefore, it became crucial for the jury to assess Victim's and 
Detective Lawrence's identification of Green.  See State v. Stephens, 398 S.C. 314, 
321, 728 S.E.2d 68, 72 (Ct. App. 2012) (finding the probative value of a mug shot 
of the defendant increased when the defendant challenged the reliability of the 
victim's identification).  Accordingly, the State had a demonstrable need to 
introduce the booking photo.   
Next, the booking photo did not "suggest [Green] has a criminal record."  Traylor, 
360 S.C. at 84, 600 S.E.2d at 528. The trial court redacted the booking photo, 
removing any identifying marks that indicated the photo was taken as a result of an 
arrest. Green is wearing street clothes and is not holding a placard or other 
information indicating an arrest.  See State v. Ford, 334 S.C. 444, 450 n.3, 513 
S.E.2d 385, 388 n.3 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding "mug shots" that depicted "[o]nly the 
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heads and necks of the individuals in the lineup" with "no identifying clothing or 
placards" did not suggest the defendant had a prior criminal record).  Although the 
booking photo includes the side-view profile picture of Green, which is a feature 
commonly associated with police mug shots, this factor alone is insufficient to 
suggest he had a prior criminal record because the jury knew Green was arrested 
for the current armed robbery and likely assumed the picture was taken following 
his arrest. See Robinson, 274 S.C. at 200-01, 262 S.E.2d at 730 (finding a photo of 
the defendant did not suggest he had a criminal record when there was nothing on 
the face of the photo that would indicate that the defendant had a prior criminal 
record, and the jury could have inferred that the photograph was the result of the 
current investigation). Therefore, the booking photo did not suggest Green had a 
criminal record.    
Further, the booking photo was not "introduced in such a way as to draw attention 
to its origin or implication."  Traylor, 360 S.C. at 84, 600 S.E.2d at 528. The trial 
court enlarged the photo so that it was "in conformity with all the other paper page 
sizes" admitted into evidence, and it also cut the "top and bottom off" of the photo 
to remove any reference to the law enforcement agency.  Importantly, the court 
admitted the photo during Detective Lawrence's testimony that the booking photo 
was a fair and accurate description of Green when he was arrested for the current 
armed robbery; therefore, the manner the photo was introduced implied that the 
booking photo was taken following Green's current arrest.  Thus, this factor weighs 
in favor of the admissibility of the booking photo.   
Finally, we note that Green suffered little prejudice, if any, from the admission of 
the booking photo because it did not suggest he had committed prior bad acts.  See
Traylor, 360 S.C. at 84 n.12, 600 S.E.2d at 528 n.12 (explaining the reason the 
admission of a mug shot is reversible error unless the State satisfies the Denson
test is that "such photos are prejudicial because they imply a defendant's prior bad 
acts"). As previously stated, there was nothing on the face of the booking photo or 
the manner in which it was introduced that suggested Green had a prior criminal 
record. In addition, the booking photo was cumulative to other evidence admitted 
at trial because the trial court admitted the line-up photo of Green that was shown 
to Victim, and Green has not challenged that ruling on appeal.  Accordingly, the 
trial court did not err in admitting the booking photo because the probative value of
the booking photo was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, and the State satisfied the Denson test. 
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III. LWOP SENTENCE 
Green argues his "sentence of LWOP, which was mandatory pursuant to the 
recidivist statute, violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment because [he] was under the age of eighteen at the time of the triggering 
offense." We disagree. 
A. Propriety of Sentencing Enhancement
Subsection 17-25-45(A)(1)(a) of the South Carolina Code (2014) provides that, 
"[E]xcept in cases in which the death penalty is imposed, upon a conviction for a 
most serious offense[,] . . . a person must be sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
for [LWOP] if that person has . . . one or more prior convictions for . . . a most 
serious offense." Armed robbery is defined as a "most serious offense."  S.C. Code 
Ann. § 17-25-45(C)(1) (2014). 
Under the recidivist statute, a conviction "means any conviction, guilty plea, or 
plea of nolo contendere."  S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-45(C)(3) (2014).  In State v. 
Ellis, our supreme court held a juvenile adjudication is not a conviction under the 
mandatory LWOP provisions of the recidivist statute.  345 S.C. 175, 179, 547 
S.E.2d 490, 492 (2001). In State v. Standard, the supreme court distinguished Ellis
and held that when a juvenile is tried and adjudicated as an adult, such that his 
guilty plea to armed robbery is in general sessions court, the guilty plea is a 
conviction for purposes of the recidivist statute.  351 S.C. 199, 203, 569 S.E.2d 
325, 328 (2002). 
The trial court did not err in sentencing Green to LWOP for armed robbery under 
the recidivist statute. At the time of sentencing for his current armed robbery 
conviction, Green had a prior conviction for armed robbery.  Although Green was 
seventeen years old when he committed the prior armed robbery, he was tried and 
convicted of that offense as an adult in general sessions court.  Based on Standard, 
because Green was tried and adjudicated as an adult, his prior armed robbery 
conviction is a "conviction" for purposes of section 17-25-45.  Moreover, armed 
robbery is a "most serious offense" under subsection 17-25-45(C)(1).  Because 
Green had a prior conviction for a "most serious offense," the trial court was 
required to sentence him to LWOP once Green was convicted of the current armed 
robbery. See § 17-25-45(C)(1) (stating a person convicted of a "most serious 
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offense" "must be sentenced to [LWOP] if that person has . . . one or more prior 
convictions for . . . a most serious offense" (emphasis added)).  Thus, the trial court 
did not err in sentencing Green to LWOP for armed robbery under section 17-25-
45. 
B. Sentence Enhancement as Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
We next address whether Green's sentence, though proper under the recidivist 
statute, nevertheless violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment.   
"The Eighth Amendment only prohibits sentences which are grossly out of 
proportion to the severity of the crime."  Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 575, 549 
S.E.2d 591, 600 (2001). 
In Standard, our supreme court held it is not cruel and unusual punishment to 
sentence a defendant to LWOP utilizing enhanced penalties for a burglary 
committed when the defendant was a juvenile so long as the defendant was tried 
and sentenced as an adult for the triggering offense.  351 S.C. at 204, 569 S.E.2d at 
328. The court stated that "an enhanced sentence based upon a prior most serious 
conviction for a crime which was committed as a juvenile does not offend evolving 
standards of decency so as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment."  Id. at 206, 
569 S.E.2d at 329 (emphasis omitted).  Likewise, in State v. Williams, this court 
held that a LWOP sentence under the recidivist statute for distribution of cocaine 
was not cruel and unusual punishment, although the defendant's prior conviction 
was for an offense committed when he was a juvenile because the sentence was not 
inconsistent with evolving standards of contemporary values, and was not grossly 
disproportionate to the committed offense. 380 S.C. 336, 345-46, 669 S.E.2d 640, 
645 (Ct. App. 2008). 
We find Green's sentence of LWOP for armed robbery does not constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment. Initially, we note that although Green was seventeen 
years old when he committed the offense that led to his prior conviction, he is 
considered a "juvenile" at the time of the prior offense for purposes of our analysis.  
See Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534, 537 n.1, 765 S.E.2d 572, 573 n.1 (2014) 
(recognizing "Miller4 extends to defendants under eighteen years of age and 
4 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (holding "mandatory [LWOP] 
sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment").     
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therefore for the purposes of this opinion we consider juveniles to be individuals 
under eighteen"). Thus, the trial court erred in finding Green was not a juvenile at 
the time of his prior conviction.  Nevertheless, the trial court did not err in finding 
Green's sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because our 
appellate courts have rejected the argument that it is cruel and unusual punishment 
to use prior convictions for offenses committed as juveniles for sentencing 
enhancement under section 17-25-45. See Standard, 351 S.C. at 204, 569 S.E.2d 
at 328; Williams, 380 S.C. at 345-46, 669 S.E.2d at 645.  We note that this case is 
somewhat different from Standard because there the defendant had finished 
serving the sentence for his first offense prior to committing the second offense 
that led to his LWOP sentence. 351 S.C. at 201, 569 S.E.2d at 326-27.  Here, 
however, Green had not yet served his first sentence for armed robbery prior to
committing the second armed robbery that led to his LWOP sentence.  This is an 
important consideration because one theory of the recidivist statute is to punish 
"persons who continue to commit criminal, antisocial behavior after incarceration
for an earlier offense." State v. Benjamin, 353 S.C. 441, 446, 579 S.E.2d 289, 291 
(2003) (Waller, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  Nevertheless, our supreme court 
has never held that a defendant must finish serving his first sentence before he may 
be sentenced to LWOP under the recidivist statute based on a subsequent 
conviction for a most serious offense.   
We also find Green's reliance on Miller is misplaced.  Although Miller held that 
mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment, Green 
was twenty years old at the time of sentencing; therefore, he was not a juvenile 
when he was sentenced to LWOP.  Miller's holding was based, in part, on the 
"recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking" of children; however, because
Green was not a juvenile at the time he committed the current armed robbery, the 
policy considerations from Miller are inapplicable. 132 S. Ct. at 2458; see also 
Aiken, 410 S.C. at 541-42, 765 S.E.2d at 576 ("[T]he Court in Miller noted that . . . 
children were constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes, a 
conclusion that was based on common sense as well as science and social 
science."). Therefore, Green's LWOP sentence did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment. 
C. Discretion  
Green next argues that even if the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment does not forbid sentencing defendants to mandatory LWOP when the 
triggering offense occurred when the defendant was under eighteen years old, the 
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Eighth Amendment requires trial courts to make individualized sentencing 
decisions. We disagree.  Green's sentence was within the limits provided for by 
statute and the record does not reveal his sentence was the result of prejudice, 
oppression, or corrupt motive by the trial court.  Therefore, we have no authority to 
review Green's sentence.  See State v. Franklin, 267 S.C. 240, 246, 226 S.E.2d 896, 
898 (1976) (stating "[an appellate court] has no jurisdiction to review a sentence, 
provided it is within the limits provided by statute for the discretion of the trial 
court, and is not the result of prejudice, oppression or corrupt motive").   
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court is 
AFFIRMED.   
FEW, C.J., and THOMAS, J., concur.        
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